When the protests in Tunisia began taking effect, some analysts considered that these events were specific to the political, economic and social circumstances found there. They did not believe that there would be a Tunisia effect, or a spread of what was subsequently named the Jasmine Revolution. The events of the last month across the Arab world have proven that thesis incorrect. Indeed, since the Egyptians succeeded in toppling Mubarak there have been greater reverberations which are currently being felt in unrest across the Middle East and beyond.
The real issue is that the circumstances across the Middle East have some commonalities which have sparked these uprisings – that is the illegitimacy of the state – irrespective of whether that state is a monarchy, pseudo republic or any other form of government, and the removal of the fear factor as a result of the perceived success of the Tunisian and subsequent Egyptian protests. The governing elites in the region are not seen as representing the opinions and viewpoints of the masses, but are rather viewed as tools of the West, largely in place to ensure the interests of others while suppressing the aspirations of the population of the region. Recent well-publicised examples of this are the Egyptian government’s position during the war on Gaza in 2009, and their role in the facilitating the American rendition program since the mid 1990’s, acting as a type of offshore torture facility for the CIA. This explains some of the chants previously heard in Tahrir square against Mubarak and his regime – such as “O you Zionist, O you coward, O you American Agent”. The people of Egypt were not on the streets protesting for bread alone, but for independence, and a government that both represents them and is accountable to them.
Given the geostrategic value of the Egyptian regime to the United States, it was not a surprise that they were scrambling since the first days of the protests to bring the situation under some sort of control. The initial reaction of Hilary Clinton was to play down the issue, voicing the administrations opinion that the Egyptian dictatorship was stable, and the regime there was capable of dealing with the protestors’ demands, obviously relying that the strongman tactics which have kept the population in Egypt and in fact throughout the region submissive would once again suffice on this occasion. (The same process is currently being played out with another of the West’s critical allies in the region – Bahrain). Shaken by the scale of the protests, it was quite clear that such a position was untenable, and the Americans began scrambling along with the regime to contain what was rapidly escalating into a situation out of their control. Though they would have liked to keep their “good friend” (ex VP Cheney’s words), and their preferred “force for stability and good” (Obama’s words) in place, they quickly began working with their contacts in the Egyptian military to work out the best way to contain the situation and allow for an “orderly and peaceful transition” – which is codeword for maintaining the essential status quo in which the Americans are able to work with the Egyptian military for the sake of their strategic interests in the region.
It is telling that at the very start of the protests in Egypt, Sami Enan chief of general staff was actually in the US, and according to some reports the commander in chief (and now head of government) Mohammad Hussein Tantawi actually flew over at the start of the protests (fulfilling his role as "Mubarak's poodle", the affectionate term used to describe him by mid-ranking Egyptian military). Working according to plan, the Egyptian military allowed the demonstrations to build to a crescendo before sending Mubarak to his retirement in Sharm el-Sheikh as a sacrifice to take the sting out of the protests, while the Mubarak regime remained largely in place and untouched. The chants of the public eulogising the Egyptian Army suggest that this initially worked, but perhaps not as smoothly as was hoped given Mubarak’s unexpected stubbornness at being forced onto the guillotine once he had clearly passed his expiry date. Just like a loyal employee being given his redundancy letter against their will his denial of reality and attempted last stand were certainly understandable, but the sense of betrayal felt as a result of it by the Egyptian people may come back to haunt the military command at a later date.
To keep the pressure off the regime as represented by the military council, there are a number of ploys that will be used at various times to release pressure and distract the Egyptian masses of from any substantive issues at hand, with certain concessions being met while change is carefully “managed”. Amongst these concessions already seen include the dissolution of parliament, the formation of a committee to propose amendments to the constitution, and the arresting of dispensable members of the previous government. At the same time, the main figures on the council of Enan, Tantawi and Omar Suleiman, remain firmly in control as well as closely tied to America, and the government appointed by Mubarak in his final days remains in place.
Parts of the opposition have not fallen for this trick and the protests meanwhile continue through strikes and various demands being made for the constitution to be completely voided and rewritten – with some of the public slowly losing trust in the military’s intentions to bring about real change. This mistrust is well-placed given that the same figures were effectively the hand behind the previous regime and that it remains largely in place apart from its public face and most visible expendable villains such as Ahmad Izz. The formal opposition who joined the demonstrations late, and then joined the negotiations, keeping one foot in the revolution, and another foot in the regime, have lost some of their credibility amongst the people while gaining some with the Western governments as being potential agents of "change" (read - staying the same). The status quo is no longer tenable and any cosmetic changes within the current constitution will likely only store up the underlying problems for a showdown at a future date. The delay can be extended by the formation of a democratic government which is nominally elected by the people but keeps guard over American interests in the region, but any government which does not represent the people even if brought to power through “democracy” (such as that in Pakistan) will likely not last long while their aspirations remain unfulfilled.
The question comes – what are the possible solutions? This is pressing since the people on the streets are united upon shared grievances, but there is no obvious leadership emerging. The people are looking for independence as well as a complete change of system. This is currently being expressed in the media as the “pro-democracy” movement. Indeed in Egypt, according to a World Opinion Poll carried out in 2006 about 80% felt democracy was good, and in Pew Global Attitudes poll in 2010 around 60%, both majorities. The “International Community” is also pushing for a “democratic” solution. At the same time – their call for democracy is tempered by the issue of Islam – the West wants democracy in Egypt, as long as it is their democracy. Or in other words, "Democracy" is preferable to "Dictatorship" in Egypt, as long as the outcome is the same – a government in place that will work with us, for our interests. Hence all the previous demands coming out of the senate from John McCain and John Kerry putting conditions upon participation in politics in Egypt, and more recently the American Administration have announced more than $100 million in aid to help (read – control) the building of a democracy in Egypt. Choice is fine – as long as they choose what we like. In this respect it is worth noting that while Egypt could possibly be allowed to elect their government since the final acts of domesticating of the Muslim Brotherhood through the international media and negotiation with the regime is paying dividends, Bahrain as of yet cannot due to doubts over the Shia majority there making the right (read – anti-Iranian/ pro-Western) choice.
In any case, whatever the protestations of the current American administration while they try to rewrite decades of support for a brutal dictatorship which imposed itself upon its people through arbitrary arrest and torture - it is not Islamic or religious government, dictatorship, theocracy or democracy in the Middle East which really exercises America and its allies as shown by their embrace of the Saudi regime which bases its legitimacy on religious symbolism, the 30 year backing of the Mubarak presidency, its current support for the obviously unrepresentative Bahraini monarchy, as contrasted to its overthrow of the democratically elected nationalist Mossadeq in Iran in the 1950’s. As its history in the region and other areas across the World show the real issue is the maintenance of American interests, however achieved.
It would be valid to ask whether the “democracy” the Egyptians support is in substance comparable to that as understood by the West given the same desire to see Islamic rules normally considered antithetical to Western democratic tradition, such as majority support for the death penalty for apostasy. One possible way to reconcile the seemingly contradictory sentiments recorded in the various polls carried out about attitudes in the region is that admiration for “democracy” in the Middle East is arguably due to the perception that it simply means being able to choose your leader and hold them accountable to the rule of law. This is of course a very attractive idea after decades of oppressive dictatorships who jail and torture any dissent. It is not the values or even the institutions of democracy as understood by the largely liberal, secular political traditions of the West, a matter which has not escaped some of the more conservative elements of Western media.
The possibility of the emergence of an independent Islamic power spanning multiple countries in the region is one which the American intelligence agencies have previously considered*, and would clearly affect their ability to enforce itself upon the region as it has been able to do with the acquiescence of such compliant regimes over the last few decades. The same World Opinion Poll which showed a majority support for democracy also highlighted that even more people (88%+) wanted to keep Western values out of Egypt, with 81% in 2008 supporting a “strict application of Shariah law” and 70% in the same year supporting the goal of “unification of all Islamic countries under a single Islamic state or Caliphate”. If these polls are to be taken seriously, with their +/- 4% accuracy, it can only be assumed that the political and media imposition of a discourse of “democracy” at the expense of Islamic government labelled as "extreme" or "fringe" is strangling a debate that needs to be had. For this to occur, there has to be less apologia from some of its advocates, and more space afforded for it within political discourse.
The constant refrain of accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of wanting to impose an “Islamic dictatorship” or “theocracy” against the will of the people and the West, which then evokes a defensive response from spokesmen of aforementioned group who claim that they only want a (tiny) slice of the democratic pie as cooked by the military following the American administration recipe book, has effectively sidelined any serious discussion about Islamic government as an alternative to the status quo in the political domain. This is problematic given that there is public sentiment in support of the idea, and no doubt the debates are carrying on between people away from the glare of the media. At the same time the orthodox Islamic theories of the Caliphate system represent an elected, accountable government and the rule of law** - all of which address the core grievances felt by the protesters from Tunisia through Egypt, Libya, Syria, Jordan to Bahrain.
That such protests have sparked such feelings of solidarity across the region also indicates the ties between the countries, whose borders in any case were the arbitrary decisions of imperial powers at the beginning of the last century. With the weakness of the nation-state in the face of globalisation, along with the illegitimacy of the regimes, entities and even constructed identities in the Middle East, it may simply be a matter of time before latent sentiments and support for unity are articulated as overt political demands. Whatever the future holds, any analysis which seeks to treat the protests and revolutions sweeping the Middle East as discrete events that will each be contained within their assigned borders will be insufficient. And even though the political discourse of the protests can be manipulated and directed, it is doubtful that this will translate into a conversion of the masses into liberal democrats. Given the state of American democracy today, that would arguably be no bad thing.
* See NIC report "Mapping the Global Future 2020", 2005
** As one example Bernard Lewis in 1993 wrote regarding the bay‘a (the equivalent of an Islamic social contract between the ruler and ruled):
“The bay‘a was thus conceived as a contract by which the subjects undertook to obey and the Caliph in return undertook to perform certain duties specified by the jurists. If a Caliph failed in those duties—and Islamic history shows that this was by no means a purely theoretical point—he could, subject to certain conditions, be removed from office.
This doctrine marks one of the essential differences between Islamic and other autocracies. An Islamic ruler is not above the law. He is subject to it, no less than the humblest of his servants. If he commands something that is contrary to the law, the duty of obedience lapses, and is replaced not by the right but by the duty of disobedience.”
